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Mozambican Legislative Development: Observations from an Institutionalization Perspective

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Abstract

Mozambique has moved from a transitional phase of democracy, however the study of the Mozambican institutional arrangements that contribute to democratic consolidation has not yet been a popular topic of comparative politics. This paper compares three Mozambican democratic legislatures by focusing on legislative institutionalization. Based on a 15-year period of original data from three Mozambican democratic legislatures, entailing all 750 legislators, this study found in three measures of legislative institutionalization, the Mozambican Assembly tends to be relatively institutionalized in two of them. In the first measure of organizational differentiation, this study reveals that the Assembly tends not to be institutionalized, that is, membership tends to be unstable and turnover frequent. However, in the second measure, the Assembly tends to be moving toward greater institutionalization. Leaders tend to be selected from within the organization and have substantial tenure in office. Thirdly, this study found that the procedure for distribution of positions of power tends to be based on a legislator's political capital, in particular their level of formal education and substantial tenure in office (i.e. seniority).

Mozambican Legislative Development: Observation from an Institutionalization Perspective¹

Introduction

The majority of legislative studies are focused on the United States Congress (Gumm and Huber 2004; Loewenberg, Squire and Kiewit 2005; Barkan 2009). Very little is known about African and Mozambican legislatures. In Mozambique, since the Fourth legislature emerged from the founding multiparty legislative election in 1994 only two studies (Ph.D. theses) have appeared on the country legislature by Macuane (2000) and by Azevedo (2009). The first study assessed legislative organization in Mozambique covering the years of the founding legislature; and the second analyzed perceptions of Mozambican legislators in a single point of time. While these studies analyzed the Mozambican Assembly, none of them compared Mozambican legislatures.

This study compares three Mozambican legislatures, the Fourth (1995-1999), Fifth (2000-2004) and Sixth (2005-2009) legislatures. It commences its comparison from the Fourth legislature for two reasons. First, the Founding Mozambican Legislature (1995-1999) was the first 'normal' legislature after the adoption of the democratic constitution in 1990 and implementation of the founding democratic legislative election in October 1994. The previous three legislatures (1977-1994) were directly elected by the people but from meetings of people's residential location and workplace (Assembleia Popular 1977:62-67) in the Frelimo one party system environment. By 1990, with the democratic constitution, conditions were 'normalized' with the acceptance of more than one political party; competitive, free and fair elections; and alternative sources of information, including: independent and private media and Non-Government Organizations. For the first time in the country's history the legislature was in 1994 directly elected by the people in more free and fair conditions. Secondly of the three legislative functions of policymaking, oversight and representation, policymaking was the only function performed by the previous three legislatures. Members were expected to ratify or rubber stamp bills initiated by the Frelimo Central Committee on behalf of its executive. After meeting for only about two weeks biannually, members left the parliament to perform other extra parliamentary responsibilities as they were not paid salary, with the exception of Steering (house keeping) committee members who began receiving salary only from the Third legislature (1986-1994). The Steering committee had the power to pass bills during the period the plenary was not in session. The oversight function, which requires members to hold bureaucrats accountable, was not performed at all. The principles of the rule of law, transparency and/or accountability were not part of the

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented in the ASRI (African Social Research Initiative) Biannual Symposium in Accra, Ghana, on 23 July 2011. Thanks to all those who commented on this paper presentation and discussed my ideas.

one party authoritarian system². If policymaking consisted of ratifying bills and oversight was not performed at all, this suggests that the representation function was weakly performed or not performed at all. Thus, the 1995-1999 legislature, that is, the Fourth legislature, becomes the most appropriate point from which to study legislative development in Mozambique.

This study compares Mozambican legislatures by focusing on legislative development, with observations from an institutionalization perspective. Legislative institutional development is relevant because it affects legislative performance in policy-making, oversight and representation. It “increases [legislators] influence upon a narrow range of policy outcomes” (Polsby 1968:166). Rosenthal found that legislative institutional development, indicated by institutional capacity and institutional power, affected greatly committee performance in policy and programme formulation (Rosenthal 1974). By comparing Mozambican legislatures, Shenga (forthcoming) found that a measure of legislative institutional development played an intervening role in the relationship between legislative recruitment, indicated by legislator’s educational abilities, and committee performance in policymaking. In addition, as legislatures develop institutionally and perform relatively well, they also affect public opinion. Legislatures that both develop institutionally and perform relatively well will be more likely to receive public support and contribute toward democratization and democratic consolidation. This means that amateur legislatures will be less likely to do so.

This study investigates systematically how the Mozambican Assembly, the Assembly of the Republic, is institutionalized by focusing on organizational differentiation from its environment, and the operational procedure for distribution of positions of power in the body. To do this the study examines firstly, the extent to which the Mozambican Assembly is differentiated from its environment; and secondly the factors that drive the operational procedure or method for distribution of positions of power in the Assembly. It investigates these aspects by comparing longitudinally three Mozambican legislatures, corresponding to a 15-year period (1995-2009).

This study proposes first, that majority of members of the Assembly are less likely to serve for extended periods in the body than those in leadership positions. Second, instead of thinking of seniority as the universalistic method applied in the conduct of internal business (Polsby 1968), this study proposes that the operational procedure for distribution of positions of power is likely to be driven by political capital,³ understood as resources that members bring to legislatures (Norris 1997:13).

The assumption that the majority of members are less likely to serve for extended periods in the body is attributed to Squire’s explanation of the institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives. Squire states that “because upward mobility is limited and House service is rewarding, members adopt long-term perspectives and

² For instance, in 1986 the government closed the Faculty of Law of Eduardo Mondlane University as jurists were monitoring government behaviour enforcing laws/policies. The Faculty was reopened only in 1991 after the adoption of the 1990 democratic constitution.

³ Also referred as political skills by Seligman (1964). It is indicated by educational abilities, occupational skills, and political experiences.

create and maintain organizational schemes to meet their career need” (Squire 1992). The Mozambican Assembly is located at the top of the political hierarchy with limited upward mobility (since only a few high positions such as the presidency and governorships exist) however the service is not rewarding for most of the ordinary Members of Parliament (MP), therefore they are less likely to serve for an extended period.

Ordinary Rank and file MPs receive salary, per diem for their attendance at plenary sessions and constituency service subsidy while committee members receive additional per diem for Committee sessions.⁴ Those MPs holding leadership positions, such as Committee Chairs and Committee Rapporteurs, Steering Committee members and Deputy-Speakers, receive further benefits including fuel, a vehicle for official use, office space, etc. Since the service is relatively rewarding for MPs in leadership positions it could be suggested that leaders adopt long-term perspectives and create and maintain organizational schemes to meet their career need by being reappointed to leadership positions of power.

The statement that a legislators’ political capital drives the operational procedure for the distribution of positions of power is attributed in Seligman (1964), that “elite recruitment patterns determine avenues for political participation and status”. Essentially better educated legislators, with higher-status occupations and political experiences are more likely to be appointed into leadership, power or high-status positions and subsequently participate more in the discussion of bills and oversight of executive agencies.

Data, Research Design and Data Analysis

This study tests and assesses these assumptions by employing original data covering a 15-year period, corresponding to the three first Mozambican democratic legislatures, that is, the Fourth (1995-1999), Fifth (2000-2004) and Sixth (2005-2009) legislatures. The data entails the full population of the three legislatures and was collected from three legislators’ directories, that is, *Who’s Who in the Assembly of the Republic*.⁵ Considering each legislature comprised 250 legislators, this study data entails 750 legislators directly elected by the people. The Who’s Who directories comprises data about the legislator’s level of formal education, their occupation, political experiences, tenure in office, age, gender, marital status, constituency and position they occupy in the Assembly, among other characteristics. The data was gathered and entered into statistical software by the author creating a Who’s Who dataset.

The data is at the micro (individual legislator’s) level and the unity of analysis is the legislature. This study is comparative and uses single country studies as the method

⁴ The average member compensation (including salary and allowances) in the three Mozambican legislatures (1995-2009) is \$1,298 (Shenga, forthcoming).

⁵ Assembleia da República and AWEPA. 1996; 2001 and 2006. *Quem é Quem na Assembleia da República* (Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Legislatures).

of comparison (see Landman 2009). It compares three legislatures longitudinally within a single political system, the Mozambican political system.

This study employs a systematic research design, suggesting that “people of many ages, behaviours, and opinions are represented within the study population” (Lewis-Beck, Bryaman and Liao, 2004:299-230). In addition, as it deals with the full legislative population rather than its sample, as can be seen above, this suggests that individuals of all ages, behaviours, and opinions of the Mozambican legislatures are represented within the study population. It combines a systematic design with a quantitative method, which suggests that the study observations are numerical amenable to statistical analysis.

The data analysis is performed at three levels: uni-variate, bivariate and multivariate levels. Uni-variate descriptive analysis is employed to describe the patterns of membership differentiation from its environment; political capital, and distribution of positions of power. This is done by generating the frequencies to which those patterns occurs in the three legislatures. Bivariate descriptive analysis is used to establish connections between one independent variable (e.g. formal education) and dependent variable (i.e. distribution of positions of power). This is achieved by measuring associations between two variables.

Multivariate explanatory analysis is employed to test the operational procedure that the Mozambican Assembly uses to distribute its members into positions of power and also to make sure that the bivariate associations are not spurious. This study tests the effect of political capital considerations on the distribution of positions of power using Ordinary Least Square Multiple Regression. It does so considering simultaneously the impact of substantive tenure in office (i.e. seniority) (Polsby 1968).

Literature Review

The study of legislative development commences with Nelson Polsby’s assessment of the United States House of Representatives (Polsby 1968). Polsby referred to legislative development as legislative institutionalization. Polsby (1968) conceptualized an institutionalized or developed organization as having three major characteristics.

Firstly that the organization is relatively well differentiated from its environment. Its membership is stable, with turnover infrequent and entry relatively difficult. Its leaders are recruited from within the organization and have substantial tenure in office. Second, the organization is relatively complex, that is, “there is growth in the autonomy and importance of committees, growth of specialized agencies of party leadership, and the general increase in provision of various emoluments and auxiliary aids to members in the form of office space, salaries, allowances, staff aid, and committee staffs” (Polsby 1968:153). Third, the organization operates on a universalistic base (i.e. seniority) rather than particularistic criteria, and automatic rather than discretionary methods for distribution of positions of power (Polsby 1968).

As legislative studies have been carried out in legislatures other than the U.S. House of Representatives, Polsby's theory has slightly or significantly modified. By applying Polsby's general theory of legislative institutionalization at the state legislative level of the California Assembly, Squire (1992) found that the universalistic criteria, indicated by the seniority procedure, does not apply at California legislative level for distribution of positions of power because members of the California Assembly have different career ambitions from U.S. Representatives. Squire explains this difference by the place the House and State legislatures occupy in the hierarchy of the political system. As the House is located at the top of the political hierarchy with limited upward mobility and the House service is rewarding, House members adopt long-term perspectives and create and maintain organizational schemes to meet their career need. But members of state legislatures adopt a short-term perspective because they have more opportunities and ambitions to run for higher office. The fact that state legislatures are located at the intermediate level in the hierarchy of political system, gives their members more chances for upward mobility.

Squire (1992) also suggests the separation of 'internal complexity' from legislative institutionalization as most of its considerations indicate professionalization of the legislature. Hibbing defines legislative professionalization "as involving changes that deal with the body itself and that can be accomplished by statute or by legislative edict. Included would be session length, member compensation, number of staff, other perquisites, general legislative resources, and committee structure" (Hibbing 2005:37). Another measure that also does not apply is the extent to which the party machinery within the legislature is distinct from the party machinery outside the legislature as it expresses boundedness better than complexity (Squire 1992; Rosenthal 1996:184).

Therefore, what remains as institutionalization from Polsby's conceptualization are the characteristics of organizational differentiation and operational procedure for the distribution of positions of power. Rosenthal states: "The conceptual core of institutionalization is the notion of boundedness – that is, the separation of the institution from its environment" (Rosenthal 1996). It is indicated by personnel differentiation, that is, the entrance and exits of members and leaders; the degree to which norms exist and members follow norms that differentiate them from non members; and the institution has authority to manage its own affairs without substantial control or intervention from outside (Rosenthal 1996:1986-190). Similarly, Hibbing's (2005) measures of institutionalization include norms and standard operational procedures, institutional autonomy, leadership positions that require extensive service in the body itself, and extended careers in the body.

The concept of legislative institutionalization together with the concepts of legislative professionalization and legislative reform are part of a multidimensional concept of legislative development. Rosenthal (1996) observes legislative development from three perspectives: legislative reform, legislative professionalization and legislative institutionalization. Therefore, Rosenthal adds to the Polsby formulation (that is, legislative development rather than institutionalization) the concept of reform, which

“accurately describes the development of legislatures, particularly in terms of their capacity and strengths” (Rosenthal 1996:173).

Assessing Legislative Institutionalization in the Mozambican Assembly

If the Mozambican Assembly is institutionalizing relatively from the Fourth to Sixth legislatures, we will observe that the organization is relatively well differentiated from its environment, and that the operational procedure for distribution of positions of power is driven by political capital.

Organizational Differentiation

Organization differentiation is measured by membership stability and leadership selection from within the organization with substantive tenure in office (Polsby 1968). Membership stability can be indicated by retention (that is, the number or proportion of members that kept their seat from the previous legislature at the beginning of a legislature) or turnover (that is, the number or percentage of new members in the beginning of a legislature) of the Members of the Assembly or by the average years of member service in the legislature (Squire 1988).

This study measures membership stability employing the following question: Was he or she a Member of Parliament in the past legislature? If the response to this question is ‘Yes’ it suggests membership retention or that the legislator has substantial tenure in office. If ‘No’, it signifies membership turnover or that the legislator is without legislative experience. Who’s Who data in Table 1 shows that the average membership stability is only 30.7 percent, suggesting that turnover is very frequent. Approximately seven in every ten (69.3 percent) Members entering into the Mozambican Assembly are novices without legislative experience.

Table 1: Membership Stability in Three Mozambican Legislatures

	Fourth legislature (1995-1999)	Fifth legislature (2000-2004)	Sixth legislature (2005-2009)	Average of all legislatures (1995-2009)
	%	%	%	%
Membership retention from the past legislature	NA*	41.9	19.6	30.7
Membership turnover from the past legislature	NA	58.1	80.4	69.3
Total	NA	100	100	100
Membership retention before the past legislature	NA	NA	41.6	41.6
Membership turnover before the past legislature	NA	NA	58.6	58.6
Total	NA	NA	100	100

*NA means the question was Not Applicable to that legislature.

By comparing legislatures, we observe that this data varies significantly. In the founding democratic legislature, all legislators were new to the democratic legislative process and responsibilities as well as the democratic procedures of political

participation and competition, rule of law, and both vertical and horizontal accountabilities. Thus no data about retention and turnover is recorded. In the Fifth legislature (41.9 percent), the level of membership retention was significantly above the three legislature average (30.7 percent), but it declined in the Sixth legislature (19.6 percent). From the Fifth (58.1 percent) to Sixth (80.4 percent) legislatures, the Assembly increased very significantly recruiting members with no substantive tenure in office. As the recruitment agent of the Mozambican legislators is actually political parties rather than legislatures, this has to be attributed to political parties.

Besides simply collecting data on membership stability from the past legislature this study also gathered data on membership stability before the past legislature. However this was only possible to do in the Sixth legislature analysing whether the MPs of the Sixth legislature served in the Fourth legislature. The results suggest that the more we move back the fewer apprentices we observe in the body. In fact, while average membership stability from the past legislature is 30.7 percent, membership stability before the past legislature is higher (41.6 percent).

Moving to the second measure of organizational differentiation, this study compares the extent to which leaders of the Mozambican Assembly are likely to be selected within the organization and have substantive tenure in office. The results in Table 2 show that the average years served in the Assembly before the second and third selection as Speaker or Committee chair is 3.5 years.

Table 2: Years Served in the Assembly before First, Second and Third Selection as Speaker and Committee Chair

	Fourth Legislature (1995-1999)	Fifth Legislature (2000-2004)	Sixth legislature (2005-2009)	Average
Speaker				
Eduardo Joaquim Mulembwe	NA	5	10	7.5
Committee chair				
Virgínia Videira	NA	5	10	7.5
Ossumane Aly Dauto	NA	5	10	7.5
Alfredo Gamito	-	0	5	2.5
Aurélio Zilhão	-	0	-	0
Domingos Pilale	-	0	-	0
Jerónimo Malagueta Naila	NA	5	10	7.5
Dionísio Ferreira Quelhas	-	0	-	0
Eduardo Nihia	NA	5	-	2.5
Alexandre Meque Vicente	-	-	0	0
Lutero Simango	-	DNS	5	2.5
Leopoldo Ernesto	NA	DNS	10	5
Açucena Duarte	-	DNS	5	2.5
Total Average years	NA	2.7	7	3.5

Dash means he or she did not serve as Member of Parliament in that legislature.

DNS means he or she served as Member of Parliament but not as Committee chair.

NA means that he or she served as Speaker or Committee chair in the founding democratic legislature but the question does not apply as before the founding legislature Mozambican Assembly was completely amateur.

Of all of the 13 leaders (i.e. the Speaker and Committee chairs), 4 served 7.5 years in the Assembly before their second or third selection as such; 1 served 5 years; 4 served 2.5 years; and 4 leaders never served before in the body before their second or third selection.

Comparing legislatures the data shows that there is a relative growth in selecting leaders from within the Assembly and have substantive tenure in office. As the Fourth legislature is the founding democratic legislature, it is an unbounded legislature. All the leaders, including the Speaker and Committee Chairs,⁶ from the Fourth legislature, entered laterally from outside with no prior democratic legislative experience. However, from the Fifth to Sixth legislature leaders begin to be recruited from within the Assembly and with substantive tenure in office. Their apprenticeship period lengthens. Of the 9 leaders in the Fifth legislature 5 have served five years in the founding democratic legislature before their second selection as Speaker or Committee Chair while 4 have never served before.

Of the 9 leaders in the Sixth legislature 5 have served ten years in the Assembly before their third or second selection as Speaker or Committee Chair⁷ and 3 have served five years before first selection. Only one leader, that is, Committee Chair, has not served any year in the organization before his first selection as leader. In summary, the average years served in the Assembly before the selection as Speaker or Committee chair increased from 2.7 years in the Fifth legislature to 7 years in Sixth legislature (Table 2).

The Operational Procedure for the Distribution of Positions of Power

This study tests whether the legislator's political capital (i.e. educational abilities, occupational status and political experiences), controlled for substantive tenure in office, is the operational method for the distribution of positions of power in the Assembly. But before testing this, it compares first, the extent to which Mozambican legislators are distributed into positions of power and second whether they possess political capital.

Distribution of positions of power is measured by the highest parliamentary position performed by a MP. The Mozambican Assembly entails the following parliamentary positions: the Speaker, Deputy-Speaker, Caucus Leader, Deputy-Caucus Leader, Steering Committee member, Caucus Rapporteur, Committee Chair, Committee Rapporteur, Committee member, and Rank-and-File member. Rank and file members are at the bottom of parliamentary positions. The average of the three legislatures in Table 3 show that almost half (46.9 percent) of the Assembly population are Rank and file members with work limited to the attendance of plenary sessions.

⁶ For the purpose of this variable this study used the Speaker and Committee Chair as leadership position. Leadership position of Deputy-Speaker, Steering Committee member, Caucus and Deputy-Caucus leader were excluded. The reason is that the work of the top two may be more tangible.

⁷ Leopoldo Ernesto was selected first and second time as Committee Chair in the Fourth and Sixth legislatures. In the Fifth legislature he was selected as Deputy-Speaker.

The membership in the Rank and file position did not vary significantly across the three legislatures. However a slight reduction is observed from the Fourth (49.2 percent) to Fifth (46.8 percent) and Sixth (44.8 percent) legislatures. This reduction, especially in the Fifth legislature, is explained by the establishment of one more standing committee in 2000 - the Committee of Petitions, to deal with public claims, complaints and petitions. From the Fifth legislature a small number (15) of Rank and file members therefore found upward mobility for a career opportunity by serving as a standing Committee Member.

At the intermediate parliamentary position we find those legislators who are Committee Members (39.1 percent). This group is mainly responsible for in-depth appreciation of all parliamentary bills that the Speaker refers to them. This group is led by Committee Chairs (3.1 percent) with support of Committee Rapporteurs (2.9 percent). At the top of the parliamentary positions is, of course, the Speaker (0.4 percent) who is supported by Deputy-Speakers (0.9) and below them, Caucus Leaders (0.9 percent) and their deputies (0.9 percent), Steering Committee Members (4.4 percent) and Caucus Rapporteurs (0.5 percent).

Table 3: Distribution of Positions of Power in Three Mozambican Legislatures

	Fourth legislature (1995-1999)		Fifth legislature (2000-2004)		Sixth legislature (2005-2009)		Average of all legislatures	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Speaker	1	.4	1	.4	1	.4	1	.4
Deputy-Speaker	3	1.2	2	.8	2	.8	2	.9
Caucus Leader	3	1.2	2	.8	2	.8	2	.9
Deputy-Caucus Leader	1	.4	2	.8	2	.8	2	.7
Steering Committee Member	13	5.2	10	4	10	4	11	4.4
Caucus Rapporteur	0	0	2	.8	2	.8	1	.5
Committee Chair	7	2.8	8	3.2	8	3.2	8	3.1
Committee Rapporteur	7	2.8	7	2.8	8	3.2	7	2.9
Committee Member	92	36.8	98	39.2	103	41.2	98	39.1
Rank-and-File Member	123	49.2	117	46.8	112	44.8	117	46.9
Missing	0	0	1	.4	0	0	0	.1
Total	250	100	250	100	250	100	250	100

In the Assembly of the Republic MPs may occupy more than one parliamentary position. Some are both Committee Chair and Standing Committee Member. The speaker is both Speaker and Steering Committee Chair and Member. Considering that the parliamentary position variable is indicated by the highest parliamentary position performed by a MP some categories should not have the expected count or percentage. For instance, considering there are 8 Committees each entailing 15 members in the Sixth legislature we should observe 120 Committee Members.

Top positions of power below the Speaker vary according to political party representation in the Assembly. Considering that there were three caucuses in the Fourth legislature, three Deputy-Speakers positions were established. The same applies to Caucus Leaders. The existence of only one Deputy-Caucus Leader in the Fourth legislature instead of three, as there were three caucus, may be attributed to

either lack of information in the Who's Who or to the fact that two caucuses in that legislature did not establish that position in their institution.

Political capital, also known as political skill (Seligman 1964), is “understood to include the resources aspirants bring to [legislatures]” (Norris 1997:13). This study measures political capital by educational abilities, occupational skills and political experiences. An educational ability is measured by a legislator’s level of formal education. Occupational status is measured by a legislator’s occupational status before he or she was elected to office; and political experience by whether he or she has worked as a Minister or Deputy-Minister, suggesting political experience at the central level. If he or she did not work as a Minister or Deputy-Minister then it is assumed that he or she does not have political experience at that level. The same applies to political experience at provincial (e.g. governor), local (e.g. mayor, district administrator or local councillor) and grass root (e.g. traditional ruler, chief of administrative post or ward or locality secretary) levels.

Table 4 shows that of the three legislatures analyzed in this study, at least all of them have Members with some levels of formal education. Among them 29.5 percent have some university, 60 percent secondary and 8.9 percent primary education. With respect to occupational status, the vast majority (80 percent) are professional, managerial and white collar. Most did not have political experience before they stood as a MP. The levels of political experiences at all levels do not pass one-tenth; it is highest at the local level (9.2 percent).

Table 4: Political Capital in Three Mozambican Legislatures

	Fourth Legislature (1995-1999)		Fifth Legislature (2000-2004)		Sixth Legislature (2005-2009)		All the three legislatures %
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	
Formal education							
No education	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Primary	38	15.2	14	5.6	15	6	8.9
Secondary	141	56.4	166	66.4	143	57.2	60
University	68	27.2	67	26.8	86	34.4	29.5
Unknown	3	1.2	3	1.2	6	2.4	1.6
Occupational status							
Professional, managerial and white-collar	194	77.6	199	79.6	207	82.8	80
Manual workers	18	7.2	7	2.8	12	4.8	4.9
Others	33	13.2	35	14	24	9.6	12.3
Unknown	5	2	9	3.6	7	2.8	2.8
Political experiences							
Central	12	4.8	15	6	8	3.2	4.7
Provincial	17	6.8	23	9.2	14	5.6	7.2
Local	15	6	21	8.4	33	13.2	9.2
Grass root	4	1.6	2	.8	10	4	2.1

By assessing changes over time, we observe a significant increase of legislators with University education from the Fourth (27.2 percent) to Sixth (34.4 percent) legislature. Similarly with secondary education, we observe an increase from the Fourth (56.4 percent) to the Fifth (66.4 percent) legislature. Legislators with professional, managerial and white collar occupation also increased significantly from the Fourth (77.6 percent) to the Sixth (82.8 percent) legislature. And legislators with political experience at the local level changed significantly and positively from the Fourth (6 percent) to the Sixth (13.2 percent) legislature.

Does Political Capital Matter?

Political capital (Norris 1997), also known as political skill (Seligman 1964), is a factor of change and legislative development (Seligman 1964:619-20). If political capital of the members of the Mozambican Assembly really matters for the institutional development of their legislatures, then we will observe political capital indicators to be associated with the distribution of positions of power.

Bivariate correlations, which constitute the first step for measuring relationships, show associations between political capital and distribution of positions of power (see the first column of coefficients in Table 5).

Table 5: Explaining the Operational Procedure for Distribution of Positions of Power in the Mozambican Assembly

	All the three legislatures (1995-2009)		
	Bivariate correlations	Model 1	Model 2
Political capital			
Formal education	.367**	.329***	.335***
Professional, managerial & white collar	.175**	.031	
Manual workers	-.136**	-.033	
Political experience at central level	.084*	.006	
Political experience at provincial level	.040	.058	
Political experience at local level	.014	.019	
Political experience at grass root level	.007	.030	
Substantive tenure in office			
Membership retention from the past legislature	.193**	.131***	.126***
Membership retention before the past legislature	.189**	.105***	.111***
Adjusted R Square		.175	.165

Entries in Models 1 and 2 are standardized OLS regression beta coefficients and in bivariate correlations are Pearson's correlation coefficients.

Model 1 incorporates all independent variables. Model 2 incorporates only those that were found significant in Model 1.

****Significant at the level of .001; ** Significant at the level of .01; * Significant at the level of .05*

Better educated members, those with managerial, professional and white collar occupation and to some extent members with political experience at the central level tend more to be distributed in positions of power than others. Manual worker members tend less likely to be distributed to positions of power while political experiences at the provincial, local and grass root level are not associated at all with

the distribution of positions of power. Their correlations are not significant. The results also show positive associations between the two variables of membership retention and distribution of positions of power. Members with substantial tenure in office from the past legislature and those with substantial tenure before the past legislature are more likely to be distributed to power positions than new Members (Table 5).

Although some political capital and substantive tenure in office considerations appear to be associated with the distribution of positions of power, we do not know whether these associations are spurious and hold when testing all of them together against each other. Bivariate correlations do not take into account simultaneously other considerations in the equation. Using a multivariate technique, it will allow us to take into account many factors together when holding others constant.

Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 5 present a multivariate model of the operational procedure for the distribution of positions of power.⁸ The significant impacts and their levels are presented with a star (*) sign. The positive sign in Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression beta coefficients suggests that the distribution of positions of power increase as levels of formal education; membership stabilities in the past legislature and before the past legislature; professional, managerial and white collar occupational status; and political experiences increases. On the other hand, the negative sign suggests that it decreases as manual workers increase.

However, the standardized regression coefficients for formal education and membership stabilities in the past legislature and before the past legislature are statistically significant, suggesting that these factors make a difference on the distribution of positions of power. This suggests that the method for distribution of positions of power in the Assembly is driven first by the levels of formal education of legislators and second by whether he or she has served as a MP in the previous legislatures. Better educated MPs followed by those with substantive tenure in office, that is, seniors, are more likely to be selected to positions of power. The last finding confirms the earlier finding that leadership position appointments are mainly based on selection from within the organization of members that have substantial tenure in office. Unilateral entry is difficult for occupying leadership power positions (Polsby 1968).

While Model 1, which includes simultaneously all independent variables considered in this study, contributes with roughly 18 percent of explained variance of distribution of positions of power, Model 2 which drops the considerations that are statistically

⁸ The dependent variable – distribution of positions of power – was coded as follow: 1=Rank-and-File Member; 2=Deputy-Caucus Leader, Caucus Rapporteur, Committee Chair, Committee Rapporteur, and Standing Committee Member; 3=Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Caucus Leader, and Steering Committee Member. The independent variables membership stability (that is, membership retention in the Fifth and Sixth legislatures) were coded 1=retention and 0=turnover. Political skill variables were coded as follows: Education 0=No formal education, 2=primary, 3=secondary and 4=university. Two dummy variables were created from occupation: one 'professional, managerial and white collar', which was coded 1 and the rest coded 0; and other 'manual workers' which was coded 1 and the rest 0. Political experience variables were coded 1 when the MP had experience before he or she stood to parliament and 0 when had no experience.

insignificant has a more accurate explanatory variance (i.e. Adjusted R Square) and develops a more parsimonious model (Kerry, Hall and Kozub, 2002). Model 2 explains about 17 percent of variance of distribution of positions of power. The strengths of the effect of education and membership in the Sixth legislature increased in the more accurate and parsimonious model.

Conclusions and Discussions


This study compared three Mozambican democratic legislatures by investigating legislative development from an institutionalization perspective. The results from original data covering a 15-year period corresponding to the three first Mozambican democratic legislatures (1995-2009) revealed that the Mozambican Assembly, the Assembly of the Republic, tend to be relatively institutionalized in two out of three measures of legislative institutionalization employed in this study. First, in one measure of organizational differentiation, the study found that the Assembly is not moving toward greater institutionalization from the Fourth to Sixth legislatures. Membership tends to be unstable, turnover frequent, and entry of outsiders in the legislatures tends to be relatively easy. However, in the other measure, the study found that the Assembly seems to be moving toward greater institutionalization. Leaders tend to be selected from within the organization and have substantial tenure in office.

As the Mozambican Assembly is located at the top of political hierarchy with limited upward mobility and Assembly service is rewarding for leaders, they adopt long-term careers and create and maintain organizational schemes to meet their career needs. On the other hand, the service is not very rewarding for Rank and file members who only benefit from salaries, per diem for attendance of plenary sessions and allowance for constituency service, during the interim period. After serving the first term, Rank and file members tend to find more rewarding service outside the legislature. In addition to what Rank and file members receive, leaders receive further benefits such as fuel, vehicle for official use, office space and subsidy of representation.

Second, by investigating what drives the operational procedure for conducting internal business in deciding on who is distributed in higher and lower parliamentary positions of power, this study considered two explanations: political capital/skill (Seligman 1964) and substantive tenure in office (i.e. seniority) (Polsby 1968), which were tested simultaneously against each other in a multiple regression model. The study found that the method for distribution of positions of power in the Mozambican Assembly is driven by legislator's political capital, especially their level of formal education, and substantive tenure in office. Particularistic and discretionary methods for decision making in distribution of positions of power tend to be not followed in the Mozambican Assembly. It can be assumed that substantive tenure in office reflects awareness about the legislative process and legislative responsibilities, in other words, legislative experience, and that it can be observed as one of the resources members bring to legislatures, that is, political capital. In short, this study therefore suggests that the operational method for distribution of positions of power is driven by political capital (i.e. educational abilities and legislative experience).

The findings that explain the method for distribution of positions of power can be used, however, to classify the levels of institutionalization of the compared Mozambican legislatures. Four types of legislatures can be distinguished (Figure 1). On one extreme, at the top right of Figure 1, we find an “institutionalized legislature”, which is distinguished by both members who are better educated and have substantial tenure in office. On the other extreme, at the bottom left, we observe an “amateur legislature”, characterized by both poorly educated MPs and unstable membership. Their members are not educated enough to read and understand the policies they may review and scrutinize, and the policies they monitor and evaluate. Consequently, they may perform poorly in the representation role, if we assume that legislatures and legislators exert policymaking and oversight functions to better represent their constituents and constituencies. And as their members are apprentices, they take longer to understand not only the legislative process but also their responsibilities as legislators.

Figure 1: Institutionalization of Mozambican Legislatures



The reported formal education levels include secondary and university; and membership stability refers to retention from the past legislature. ‘Institutionalized legislature’ should be located at the top right in Figure 1. ‘Amateur legislature’ should be at the bottom left; ‘relatively better educated legislature’ at the bottom right; and ‘membership stability legislature’ at the top left.

Between the ‘institutionalized legislature’ and ‘amateur legislature’ is the “membership stability legislature”, at the top left of Figure 1, and ‘relatively better educated legislature’, at the bottom right. The first is distinguished by members with substantive tenure in the Assembly that are poorly educated. The second is characterized by relatively better educated members but their membership is unstable; turnover is frequent and entry relatively easy. The last type of legislature resembles the three legislatures assessed in this study: the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth

legislatures. Of the three legislatures in this classification type, the Fourth legislature is in much worse conditions than the Fifth and Sixth legislatures, because all its members were apprentices since it was the founding democratic legislature. However, the membership stability of the Fifth (41.9 percent) is greater than of the Sixth (19.6 percent) legislature as well as it is compared to the average (30.7 percent) of the two legislatures.

Nevertheless, besides being measured by the operational procedures for the distribution of positions of power, and organizational differentiation (indicated by the extent to which leaders are recruited from within the organization and have substantial tenure in office, and members having substantial tenure in office), the concept of legislative institutionalization also involves the extent to which the organization enjoys institutional [or managerial] autonomy (Rosenthal 1996, Hibbing 2005) and the party machinery within the legislature is distinct from the party machinery outside the legislature (Squire 1992).

In terms of the potential for legislative research, this study suggests that further investigations have to be conducted to include the additional measurements of the concept of legislative institutionalization, discussed above, in order to provide a bigger picture assessing the subject. In addition, more comparative studies on the subject have to be conducted to monitor and evaluate trends longitudinally, by including forthcoming Mozambican legislatures, as well as cross nationally, by including other African legislatures.

Finally, with respect to the limits of legislative reform, this study suggests that while the Mozambican Assembly has to continue to adhere to the norms of recruiting leaders from within the organization and have substantial tenure in office as well as employing an operational procedure for the distribution of positions of power based on political capital, it should also provide more opportunities to more members to be retained in the body. In doing so, the Assembly may need to reform and professionalize more significantly from legislature to legislature. The Assembly may need to provide more incentives or benefits to Rank and file Members for example by providing them with office space, administrative and research staff, other perquisites and general legislative resources.

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